The Automation Paradox: Mastering Flight Path Management in Modern Cockpits

Purpose

Modern commercial aviation has achieved unprecedented levels of safety through sophisticated automation systems. Autopilots, autothrottles, flight management systems, and terrain awareness systems have collectively reduced human error and increased operational precision. Yet regulatory agencies worldwide—from EASA to the FAA—have issued a series of safety bulletins, advisories, and rulemaking initiatives that point to an uncomfortable truth: continuous reliance on automation is systematically degrading the manual flying skills pilots need when automation fails.

This is not a call to abandon automation. It is, rather, a call to understand the mechanics of skill degradation, the regulatory framework designed to counteract it, and the operational philosophy that allows modern pilots to maintain mastery of their aircraft in an increasingly automated environment.

The Safety Paradox: Why Automation Doesn't Guarantee Safe Pilots

Automation's Proven Benefits

The regulatory consensus is clear: automation has contributed substantially to the overall improvement of flight safety. The data supports this. Modern aircraft equipped with flight management systems, autothrottle systems, and integrated flight director capabilities have enabled:

• Increased precision in routine procedures (departures, approaches, cruise management)
• Reduced opportunity for errors through standardization and system integration
• Lower workload during normal flight phases, freeing pilots to focus on monitoring and situational awareness
• Better performance in adverse weather and complex terrain operations

These are not marginal improvements. They represent the foundation upon which modern air transport's safety record is built.

The Hidden Cost: Skill Degradation

Yet there exists a dangerous inverse relationship that regulatory agencies have only recently begun to formally codify: the continuous use of automated systems does not contribute to maintaining pilot manual flying skills. In fact, it contributes to their degradation.[1][2]

This is not theoretical speculation. According to EASA SIB 2013-05R1, "continuous use of auto-flight systems could lead to potential degradation of the pilot's ability to cope with the manual handling of the aeroplane."[1] The concern becomes operationally acute when a pilot is "normally required to revert to manual flight operation in case of automation failure or disconnection, or when an aircraft is dispatched with an inoperative auto-flight system."[1]

The paradox is this: the systems that make normal operations safer simultaneously erode the capabilities needed for abnormal operations. A pilot who has flown the last 5,000 hours exclusively with the autopilot engaged may be technically proficient in automation management while being practically incompetent at manual flight—precisely when it matters most.

The Regulatory Response: From SIBs to FAA AC 120-123

The Evolution of Policy

Between 2010 and 2023, regulatory authorities globally recognized that operator automation policies had drifted in problematic directions. Some airlines mandated full automation "at all times, except take-off and landing (when not required by operations)."[1] Others encouraged disconnecting automation "whenever possible, below a certain altitude."[1] Between these extremes lay little consistency.

This fragmentation created several risks:

1. Training-Operations Mismatch: Pilots trained in one philosophy joining operators with different policies
2. Mode Confusion: Lack of standardized automation management procedures leading to misunderstanding of aircraft behavior
3. Skill Decay: No systematic approach to maintaining manual proficiency
4. Energy State Mismanagement: Inadequate pilot understanding of how automation affects aircraft energy (altitude and speed)

In response, EASA published multiple Safety Information Bulletins:

• SIB 2010-33R1 (2015): Automation Policy—Mode Awareness and Energy State Management
• SIB 2013-05R1 (2013, revised 2025): Manual Flight Training and Operations
• SIB 2013-02 (2013): Stall and Stick Pusher Training—addressing consequences of automation-related skill loss

The FAA took a more comprehensive approach with AC 120-123: Flight Path Management (November 2022), which integrated decades of safety data into a unified operational and training framework.

A Unifying Concept: Flight Path Management

The FAA's AC 120-123 introduced a conceptual framework that has since been adopted across EASA guidance: Flight Path Management (FPM).

FPM is defined as "the planning, execution, and assurance of the guidance and control of aircraft trajectory and energy, in flight or on the ground."[3] It is deliberately non-specific about how trajectory and energy are managed—whether manually, through automation, or through hybrid approaches.

The critical operational principle is this: FPM is the pilot's responsibility at all times, regardless of which systems are controlling the aircraft.[3] The autopilot does not manage the flight path. The pilot does. The autopilot is merely one tool available to the pilot for managing the flight path.

This reversal of emphasis—from "autopilot management" to "flight path management"—represents a fundamental philosophical shift that has become the bedrock of modern pilot training and operational policy.

The Mechanics of Skill Degradation: Why Pilots Lose Manual Flying Capability

The Three Skill Categories

EASA and FAA guidance identify three interlocking skill categories required for effective manual flight operations:

1. Cognitive Skills Cognitive skills involve the mental integration of knowledge components: understanding how pitch, roll, attitude, airspeed, and descent rate interact; visualizing the desired flight path; and making real-time adjustments based on feedback from instruments and aircraft behavior.

When a pilot has not manually flown an approach in several years, the cognitive pathways that translate instrument indications into mental models of aircraft state become degraded. A pilot who has relied on the flight director's guidance for hundreds of approaches may struggle to reconstruct the mental geometry of intercepting a localizer without the flight director's visual cues.

2. Psychomotor Skills These are the physical movements—side-stick or control yoke inputs, throttle adjustments, trim wheel movements—that translate cognitive decisions into aircraft control.

Psychomotor skills atrophy faster than cognitive skills. A pilot who has not hand-flown an approach for several years may find that the fine motor coordination required for smooth control inputs has deteriorated. The subtle inputs needed for energy management during approach—small pitch changes to modulate descent rate—may feel unfamiliar or require conscious effort rather than intuitive execution.

3. Communication Skills Communication includes standard callouts, crew coordination around manual flying procedures, and the ability to clearly convey automation states and transitions to crewmates.

When manual flying is rare, the communication patterns around it become rusty. For example, a first officer or captain may struggle to conduct brief callouts during a manually flown approach.

The Workload Amplification Effect

A further complication emerges during actual manual flying operations: workload increases dramatically when pilots are unfamiliar with manual flying.[2][3]

During automated flight, workload is distributed between the aircraft systems (which handle trajectory management) and the pilot (who monitors). During manual flight, workload concentration on the pilot increases sharply. For a pilot with several thousand hours on automation, this sudden increase can overwhelm attention management systems. The pilot becomes task-saturated, situational awareness declines, and safety margins erode.

This creates a vicious cycle: degraded manual flying skills lead to higher workload during manual flight, which leads to increased errors, which reinforces the pilot's preference for automation, which further degrades skills.

Mode Awareness and Energy State Management: The Missing Piece

The Core Problem: Loss of Mode Awareness

EASA SIB 2010-33R1 identifies a critical failure mode that has appeared in multiple accidents and incidents: loss of mode awareness.[2]

Modern flight decks possess dozens of automation modes. The autopilot may be in LNAV, VNAV, ALT, or FLARE modes. The autothrottle may be in SPEED or MACH hold. The flight director may or may not be active. These modes interact in non-intuitive ways, and pilots can easily lose track of which mode is currently active—or which mode will become active after certain pilot inputs.

The scenario occurs something like this:

1. Pilot selects a new altitude in the flight management system
2. Pilot expects the aircraft to begin descending immediately
3. Autopilot is in FLCH (Flight Level Change) mode, which requires an intermediate altitude capture
4. Aircraft does not descend as expected
5. Pilot becomes confused about aircraft intent
6. Pilot makes incorrect inputs (pitching down manually, reducing thrust manually)
7. Aircraft becomes uncontrolled or exceeds limitations

This failure mode has been implicated in approach-to-stall events, terrain collisions, and exceedances of aircraft limitations. The root cause was not automation failure, but pilot failure to understand automation state.

Energy State Mismanagement

Closely related is the problem of energy state mismanagement.[2] A modern aircraft has two forms of energy: potential energy (altitude) and kinetic energy (airspeed). The sum of these—the total mechanical energy—can be managed through pitch (to trade altitude for airspeed), thrust (to increase total energy), or configuration (to trade efficiency for controllability).

Automation systems typically manage energy automatically. The autothrottle maintains a target speed; the autopilot maintains a target altitude. The pilot need not think about energy management explicitly.

But during manual flying, or during automation failures, pilots must actively manage energy. A pilot descending toward a runway at Mach 0.78 at FL250 has abundant energy. During descent, the pilot must continuously trade altitude for airspeed, managing the descent rate such that the aircraft arrives at the runway threshold at the correct speed without excessive energy remaining.

Pilots trained exclusively on automation have sometimes struggled with this energy management task, leading to approaches that are unstable—descending too steeply, arriving with excess speed, or running out of altitude before achieving required descent rates.

EASA guidance emphasizes that pilots must understand the interaction between automation modes and energy state. Certain automation modes (like continuous descent approaches) require pilot understanding of how the aircraft will manage energy throughout the approach.

Regulatory Recommendations: A Framework for Balance

EASA SIB 2013-05R1: Manual Flight Operations

EASA's primary recommendation is deceptively simple: operators should incorporate "emphasis of manual flight operations, as a means of maintaining basic flying skills, into their training programme and, when feasible, line operations."[1]

However, the implementation is nuanced. EASA recommends that operators identify "appropriate opportunities for pilots to practice their manual flying skills, taking into account factors such as:

• Phase of flight
• Workload conditions
• Altitude/Flight Level
• Meteorological conditions
• Traffic density
• Air Traffic Control procedures
• Pilot and crew experience
• Operator operational experience"[1]

The guidance explicitly notes that pilots must also "clearly understand the circumstances under which automated systems have to be used, such as during high workload conditions, while operating in traffic congested airspaces, or when following airspace procedures that require the use of autopilot for precise operations."[1]

This is critical: the goal is not to minimize automation, but to achieve balance—using automation when it improves safety and performance, using manual flight when it maintains or improves pilot proficiency.

FAA AC 120-123: Comprehensive Flight Path Management

The FAA's framework is more structured. AC 120-123 mandates that operators establish:

1. Guiding Principles These principles should state that:

• Flight path management is the responsibility of the entire flightcrew
• FPM is the highest priority for all flightcrew members
• Each pilot is responsible for being fully aware of the current and desired flight path
• Each pilot must be capable of manually flying the aircraft to achieve the desired flight path[3]

2. Operational Policies and Procedures Operators must develop detailed policies addressing:

• Appropriate use of automated systems (recognizing them as tools, not as replacements for pilot decision-making)
• Proper monitoring of the flight path during all combinations of manual and automated flight
• Task allocation between pilot flying and pilot monitoring
• Workload management and system management strategies
• Methods for addressing malfunctions[3]

3. Training Programs Training must:

• Clearly convey FPM guiding principles
• Teach individual procedures within the broader context of FPM
• Prioritize FPM in terms of emphasis and proportion of training time
• Include manual flying as an integral component[3]

4. Instructor and Evaluator Qualifications Instructors must be trained on:

• Operator FPM policy and SOPs
• How to train and assess FPM competency
• How to train and assess management of automated systems
• How to train and assess effective monitoring and scan techniques
• How to train and assess energy management
• How to develop and implement FPM-focused training scenarios[3]

Stall and Loss of Control: The Ultimate Consequence of Skill Degradation

Why Stall Training Matters in This Context

EASA SIB 2013-02 provides the most concrete evidence of skill degradation consequences. Modern, highly automated aircraft include stick shakers (automated stall warnings via control column vibration) and stick pushers (automated pitch-down systems to prevent aerodynamic stall).

These systems are highly effective. However, they cannot operate if pilots have lost the ability to recognize when manual intervention is needed.

The SIB documents a recurring pattern in accident investigation: pilots either fail to recognize an approach-to-stall condition during automated flight, or fail to respond correctly when the stick pusher activates.[5]

Why does this happen? Several reasons:

1. Loss of Angle of Attack (AOA) awareness: Pilots flying purely on airspeed indications (which are what automation typically uses) may not realize that the aircraft is approaching a high AOA that will result in stall
2. Automation surprise: When autopilot disconnects during an approach-to-stall, pilots are startled. In their startled state, they may fight the stick pusher rather than accepting its pitch-down input
3. Degraded energy management: A pilot who doesn't understand that the aircraft is descending too steeply with insufficient airspeed may fail to recognize the approach-to-stall threat until it's too late

EASA's response has been to mandate comprehensive stall and stick pusher training, including repeated exposures to stick pusher activations in the simulator until pilots can respond instinctively (allowing the pusher to reduce AOA) rather than fighting it.

This training, however, is only effective if pilots understand the broader context: automation failures, mode confusions, and energy state mismanagement that lead to approach-to-stall conditions in the first place.

Operator Implementation: Putting Theory Into Practice

The Automation Policy Framework

The regulatory framework—from EASA SIB 2010-33 through FAA AC 120-123—converges on a common recommendation: operators must develop comprehensive automation policies that address:

1. Philosophy What is the operator's fundamental stance on automation use? EASA recommends that a core philosophy of "FLY THE AIRPLANE" should permeate the automation policy.[2]

2. Levels of Automation Rather than thinking of automation in rigid "levels" (which create false hierarchies), operators should provide pilots with strategies for selecting the appropriate combination of automated systems for each situation.

3. Situational Awareness How do pilots maintain awareness of aircraft intent during automated flight? What callouts and checks are required?

4. Communication and Coordination How are automation transitions communicated between crew members? What does the pilot monitoring do during automation mode changes?

5. Verification How do pilots verify that automation is performing as intended? What are the cross-checks?

6. System and Crew Monitoring How do pilots monitor both the functioning of automated systems and each other's performance?

7. Workload and System Use When should automation be used (high workload, complex procedures)? When should manual flight be practiced (lower workload, simpler procedures)?

Integrating Manual Flying Into Line Operations

A critical implementation challenge is balancing the need for manual flying practice against operational constraints. Airlines cannot afford to have pilots hand-flying aircraft on revenue flights when doing so would increase workload or reduce operational efficiency. Instead, operators should identify appropriate opportunities:

• Stable weather, low-traffic conditions: During cruise phases with light workload, a pilot might hand-fly instead of engaging autopilot
• Training and checking: Regulatory-mandated training flights should include mandatory manual flying components
• Specific phases of flight: Some operators mandate manual flying during specific altitude bands (e.g., below 10,000 feet when operationally feasible)
• Proficiency checks: Line operations quality assurance (LOSA) and flight data monitoring (FDM) programs should track manual flying performance

The regulatory guidance explicitly states that this practice must be systematically monitored through Safety Management Systems (SMS) and Flight Data Monitoring (FDM) to ensure that manual flying practice does not degrade overall safety metrics.[1]

The Pilot's Role: Active Skill Maintenance

The Responsibility Shift

Modern pilot training has begun to shift responsibility for skill maintenance from operators to individual pilots. The phrase from AC 120-123 is telling: "Each pilot is responsible for being fully aware of the current and desired flightpath of the aircraft, and being fully capable of manually flying the aircraft to achieve the desired flightpath."[3]

This is not merely procedural responsibility. It is a statement that the pilot must actively maintain manual flying competency, even if the airline does not mandate it. A pilot approaching a major upgrade (captain's check) or a new aircraft type (transition training) must use that training period to deliberately rebuild or maintain manual flying skills.

Scenario-Based and Evidence-Based Training

Modern pilot training increasingly uses scenario-based training (SBT) and evidence-based training (EBT) to target skill areas that training data identifies as weak.

Rather than maneuver-based training (practice the approach 20 times), scenario-based training embeds the approach within a realistic operational scenario (manage a weather deviation, high workload situation, automation mode confusion) that requires decision-making and crew coordination.

Evidence-based training uses data from flight data monitoring, accident investigation reports, and pilot feedback to identify the specific scenarios and skill areas where pilots struggle most, then tailors training to address these identified weaknesses.

Conclusion: The Path Forward

The regulatory consensus is clear, and it rests on evidence: automation has improved overall flight safety, but at the cost of degraded manual flying skills if not actively managed. The path forward requires:

1. Philosophical commitment: Organizations must adopt a genuine "fly the airplane" philosophy, where flight path management remains the pilot's responsibility regardless of automation state

2. Comprehensive automation policies: Operators must develop detailed policies that specify when automation should be used and when manual flying should be practiced, based on operational context

3. Systematic manual flying practice: Pilots must receive regular opportunities to maintain manual flying skills, both in training and (when feasible) in line operations

4. Monitoring and feedback: Operators must use SMS, FDM, and safety reporting programs to track whether their automation policies are achieving the desired balance between automation benefits and pilot proficiency

5. Instructor standardization: Training staff must be comprehensively trained on FPM principles, manual flying instruction, and automation management—not just on procedure manipulation

The stakes are high. A pilot who cannot hand-fly an aircraft when automation fails is a hazard. Yet a pilot who cannot effectively use automation is equally dangerous. The modern professional pilot must be competent in both domains, switching fluidly between them as operational context demands.

This is not a return to 1970s-era flying. Modern automation, when properly understood and managed, enables safer flying than manual-only flight. Rather, it is a recognition that safety emerges from the combination of operator, aircraft, and procedure—with the pilot at the center, making conscious decisions about which tools to use and when, maintaining the skills necessary to intervene when those tools fail.

References

[1] EASA SIB 2013-05R1. Manual Flight Training and Operations. June 2025.

[2] EASA SIB 2010-33R1. Automation Policy—Mode Awareness and Energy State Management. June 2015.

[3] FAA AC 120-123. Flight Path Management. November 21, 2022.

[4] EASA SIB 2013-02. Stall and Stick Pusher Training. January 22, 2013.